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Abstract
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This essay is the third of three. The first is nontechnical and in part 
autobiograhpical describing the evolution of my approach to developing a 
microeconomic theory of money and.financial institutions. The second essay was 
devoted to a more formal sketch of a closed economic exchange system with no 
other externalities beyond money and markets. This essay builds on the existence 
of monetary exchange but also context, and active government with 
nonsymmetric information and many externaties indicate that the views of 
Keynes, Hayek and Schumpeter are all consistent with the next stages of 
complexity as the logic requires many different arrays of institutions to provide 
the necessary economic functions and adjust to the variety of socio-economic 
contexts.
Keywords: Schumpeter, Keynes, aggregation, information, disequilibrium,    
minimal institutions, innovation, playable games.
JEL Classifications: C7, D50, E4
1 Building Theories of Economic Process
In the first of two previous essays some autobiographical materiel was followed by
an essentially nontechnical discussion of why I have advocated a mixture of a game
theory, econophysics and evolutionary approaches to developing a theory of money
and financial institutions. In the second essay a step by step approach was adopted
that called for laying on successive complications to a stripped down process model
of the ADM general equilibrium models so that each of the features such as price
formation, competition, endogenous and exogenous uncertainty could be presented as
part of a process model. The natural terminal point of this treatment does not cover,
but serves as a basis from which finance, uncertainty, expectations and control can be
considered. This third essay suggests that although the act of converting any general
equilibrium model into one or more process models can be achieved without going
further, it calls for a radical change and extension of the original paradigm to include
not merely the presence of an explicit money commodity, markets and government
but also the role of innovation much like the process sketched by Schumpeter [15] and
an evolution of a politically guided economy as a birth death process.
1.1 The First Steps Toward Economic Process
Prior to specifying a new paradigm a comment on the unifying power of general
equilibrium theory is apposite. Although we use loosely the terms theory and model,
the fundamental power of general equilibrium analysis is that it is a collection of
principles for building models. It is a theory of economic constraint on optimal
choice imposed by exchange and production where the stress is on the equations at
equilibrium rather than the inequalities dominating systems in disequilibrium.
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1.1.1 The change in emphasis and paradigm
The carriers of process are mechanisms or institutions that accept and process in-
structions from active agents but they may or may not also be regarded as active
agents themselves. This is illustrated in the laws that recognize two types of per-
son, natural persons and other legal persons such as for profit and not for profit
corporations. Much of the economic activity in a modern economy is controlled by
fiduciaries acting for individual natural persons who, in many theories are presented
as the ultimate owners of all institutions.
Figure 1 represents a fully integrated recursive system for a single closed economy.
Figure 1
The closed system of a political-economy
The transition from the pure structure of economic equilibrium to unavoidable
institutional and parameter ridden models of process is forced as soon as it becomes
clear that the rules of the game are carriers of process and these carriers are the in-
stitutions and mechanisms of society that open the links of an abstract pure economy
to the institutions of the polity and society.
Figure 1 sketches a six agent simplified structure of an overall political-economy
where three boxes cover the pure economy consisting of stockholder, consumer workers
and saver workers. At a higher level of aggregation they could be considered as one,
but this distinction calls attention to the difference between equity and debt holding.
The other three boxes are financial mechanisms that supply the perception, guidance
and control system over the physical economy. The central bank covers implicitly, the
role of government in controlling the legal money supply, and implicitly in performing
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many other government activities that often call for a more disaggregated model to
include a separate government fiscal agent. In a decentralized economy, although not
a logical necessity the functions of both commercial banking and investment banking
are performed by separate institutions as is sketched in Figure 1. A basic distinction
among different banks is in the levels of evaluation and risk taking.
As anyone with any operating or consulting experience knows the Devil is in the
details. Essentially all institutions perform multiple functions. They may have been
created originally for one function, but quickly they are adapted to many others. The
many functions of a central bank require many pages to describe. The description of
the boxes in Figure 1 and their interconnections is constrained to a bare minimum,
but even six differentiated agents without further simplification produce models too
complex to treat analytically with much generality.
1.1.2 The end of the first steps
In Essay 2 a reasonably complete sketch is given going into many of the details
required to recast pure exchange among powerless individuals as process models. The
exchange economy E(n,m, ui, aj, R+nm). is reformulated in terms of strategic market
games with minimal mechanisms or institutions that enable us to define the economy
as a payable game. This involves specifying how to embed a timeless set of models
into games with the past, present and future made explicit in terms of history and
expectations; but this is done staying with a fixed set of individually owned goods
and services and the means of production modeled as passive price-taking profit-pass-
through mechanisms where non-voting stockholders are paid profits in proportion to
their holdings. All laws of trade,contract and default are obeyed implicitly.
As was noted in Essay 2, the transformation to process models requires making
explicit the roles and nature of markets, information and money as well as the role
of government as enforcer of the rules of trade.
The model of exchange and production has been opened up to the explicit ex-
istence of government, law, markets and money This provides enough structure to
be able to describe mathematically the further institutions and instruments involv-
ing finance, risk, innovation and the control and guidance problems associated with
private and public joint goods. This third essay is devoted to going beyond general
equilibrium and showing how one can reconcile a market economy with the Schum-
peter vision of innovation where increasing returns to scale aspects are due not only
to physical indivisibilities but to many other factors concerning information, diffi cul-
ties in evaluation and the needs for venture capital. These considerations lead to the
formulation of models of oligopolistic competition based on the introduction of new
goods and services in a system in disequilibrium rather than a system with a fixed set
of goods and equilibrium prices. As in the other two essays the stress is on looking
for whatever minimal structure there may be in the system in order to carry process
and indicating how this structure can be specialized to cover the details called for in
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any application.
2 A Comment on Externalities
As our main theme is the thread of economic argument concerning the properties
of market mechanisms with individually owned tradable assets the role of public
goods, externalities and property rights open up a whole new and different political
economy. These items have been discussed in [18] Chapters 10 and 11 based in part on
a suggested taxonomy noted in [16] Chapter 18. Social and political considerations
technology, indivisibilities, complexity and size of institutional structures make it
infeasible to own or to trade shares of many socially needed institutions such as
justice, the law courts, police, and defense. Unconstrained pollution raises problems
in trying to create synthetic products to provide near market solutions or to seek other
solutions. For example much of the work of Ronald Coase [3] can be regarded as a
pre-game theory attempt to consider an economic solution to problems of externalities
based on the use of the core of an n-person game.
3 From Walras to Schumpeter
Nature and Nature’s laws were hidden in the night
God said let Newton be and all was light.
It did not last: the Devil shouting ‘Ho.
Let Einstein be,’restored the status quo
Pope on Newton, with an addition.
Any form of applied economics is institutional and institutional economics has
to be messy. Even Newtonian physics applied to a subject such as optics with a
few detailed aspects of atmospheric distortion turns an overall abstraction into a
parameter laden endeavor.
The paths from abstract Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie (ADM) general equilibrium
to Keynes and to Schumpeter are there, albeit that they are institution laden where
much of the detailed structure is dictated by the specifics of an ongoing society.
3.1 The Playable Game
Given the known results [2], [5] for the mathematical equivalence between the general
equilibrium analysis and that for the solution of effi cient noncooperative equilibria
with a continuum of agents in a strategic market game, it is natural to ask ‘Is the
stress on strategic market games in these essays an instance of a pedantic distinction
differentiating general equilibrium models from strategic market games where there
is no operational difference?’
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The equivalence result stresses equilibrium. The Nash noncooperative equilibrium
solution is utilized in order to compare the equilibrium solutions to show that the
SMG noncooperative equilibrium solutions yield the same or more equilibrium results
than general equilibrium. However the whole spirit of the SMG is to stress process
regardless of equilibrium. The basic psychology of the SMG approach is to lay stress
on the construction of playable games. In doing so apart from expanding the possibil-
ity for experimentation the procedure required to debug a process model of a game
or simulation provides an important check on consistency and completeness.
3.1.1 Parameters that count in disequilibrium
A comparison of the modeling distinctions required in describing even a two player
type model of exchange of two consumer goods is suffi cient to indicate the first rela-
tively simple steps that call for the addition of many extra parameters to the general
equilibrium model 1. Table 1 shows the features directly. The following notation is
utilized. Let
1. A1, Ā2 be the initial holdings of the goods.
2. M1, M̄2 be the initial holdings of fiat money.
3. B be the initial holding of the central bank of funds that it can lend 2.
4. ρ ≥ 0 is a given interest rate at which it lends 3.
5. β ≥ 0 a natural discount 4
6. Λ, Λ̄ marginal bankruptcy penalties at the day of settlement
7. Π, Π̄ the expected value of money at the day of settlement
Table 1 presents the basic physical, financial and expectational differnces between
the models
1There are many ways in which a whole class of minimal game models can be constructed (see
[18] for a discussion), we select a simple model with a passive outside bank as suffi cient to indicate
the extra considerations when the complete state space is covered.
2In national income accounting there is a paraxodical problem posed. If the central bank(and
treasury) can create money, is there a specified legal bound as to how much it can create? In
evaluating national wealth one can count only the fiat money inside the non-central bank sector.
3One can describe systems with an endogenous or exogenous formation (or both) of the money
rate of interest. This involves including a money market for loans as well as a central bank specifying
its loan or deposit rate. Futrher discussion is given in the enormous literature on banking. Further
discussion on strategic game modeling are given in [17] and [18].
4For the model wtih one period of trade followed by settlement at the end of the game the
parameter β can be absorbed into other parameters, but it is convenient to keep it separate.
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GE SMG
Initial holdings of goods A1, Ā2 A1, Ā2
Initial holdings of fiat - M1, M̄2
Outside bank holdings of fiat na B
money interest rate na ρ
natural discount rate na β
bankruptcy rate →∞ Λ, Λ̄
expected value of money na Π, Π̄
Table 1
GE compared with SMG
We see that any general equilibrium model has associated with it a class of strate-
gic market games with an addition of eight (8) extra parameters to help characterize
a relatively simple control structure.
The non strategic economic models share with the SMG the same individuals,
original preferences and endowments. The SMG add 9 extra parameters as listed in
Table 1. The β is not logically needed as has been noted in a footnote above, but
the others are needed and merit some specific comment.
Default and bankruptcy penalties If any form of credit granting is considered a
strategic description of trade among individuals requires that the mechanism be able
to provide rules to account for how to proceed if the system reaches a point where an
individual owes a debt she cannot pay. A rule specifying how the society penalizes
the individual and treats the creditors must be given. The details concerning the
specific rules have been been discussed extensively elsewhere (see [17] Chapter 11).
The preference structure of the individual must be modified to take a bankruptcy
possibility into account. As long as the adjustment leaves the preference sets convex
without loss of generality a set of linear penalties can be used, hence for two types of
agents we need only Λ, Λ̄.The general equilibrium model with complete markets can
be assumed to avoid the problem by assuming that in the region of an equilibrium
point the bankruptcy penalty has been set suffi ciently high to avoid active strategic
bankruptcy. A dimensional analysis of the penalty requires its dimensions to be
utility/money thus a numeraire is established for the price system linking fiat to real
goods.
Fiat money A useful simplification preliminary to considering infinite horizon mod-
els is the introduction of a fiat money as a means of payment in an exchange economy
where the money enters as a separable and linear term 5. Suppose that the holdings
in the economy of the durable good that is fiat money are M1, M̄2 then the Pareto
surface of the GE model without money is a curve from P
(
A1 + A2 + Ā1 + Ā2
)
, P̄ (0)
to P (0) , P̄
(
A1 + A2 + Ā1 + Ā2
)
however we need to add the predicted worth of the
5The full justification of this step is given in [18].
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fiat owned by the agents thus a linear part of the new Pareto surface appears with










Trade, borrowing and lending There are many means of payment, ways of trade
and ways of borrowing. Here a minimal model has individuals only able to borrow
from an outside bank at a given rate ρ and to bid only with bank money and offer
goods for sale.
Out of equilibrium a welter of inequalities and boundary conditions must be ac-
counted for. An attractive way to face up to them is look only for equilibrium
conditions in multistage dynamics. This can be done even at this level of a one stage
process model with an evaluation for any left over assets at a day of settlement.
The rational expectations analysis does this by selecting ex ante predictions that by
perfect foresight and coordination of all match the activity of all.
As this holds there will be no bankruptcy and no need for a special monetary asset
as all books will balance thus the full apparatus of the strategic game is unnecessary.
If we wish to be able to study motion for even one period without the assumption
of universal coordinated rational expectations the full apparatus of the strategic game
is necessary.
An elementary mathematization of Schumpeter’s ideas calls for the addition of at
least one random variable and the creation of new products as is noted below.
An elementary mathematization of the observation of Keynes is already implicit
in the structure once the possibility of error and initial conditions out of equilibrium
are considered.
3.1.2 GE to SMG to Schumpeter and Keynes
The specific challenge faced in the production of playable games is the production
of minimal process models showing that with the appropriate empirically relevant
enlargements the insights both of Keynes and Schumpeter are naturally reflected in
SMGs that are consistent with the abstraction of general equilibrium.
In Sections 3 and 4 below Schumpeter and then Keynes are dealt with. In some
sense both appear to deny the elegant simplicity of general equilibrium, but both
arise from attempts to extend the static virtues of an institution free economic price
system by adding carriers of process and then by considering the nature of motivation
and the problems of coordination and information in actual processes.
3.1.3 An aside on the explosion of complexity
Considerations from basic extensive form game theory, combinatorics and elementary
physics and biology and any social science tell us that in any topic considered as soon
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as there are more than two or three time periods 6; two or three persons, and two
or three states of the system at any time, the explosion of cases becomes hyper-
astronomical. A simple example is provided by a 2 × 2 matrix game often used
in teaching elementary game theory. If we consider that the two players can rank
order their four payoffs there are 726 strategically different games. If each had three
choices, giving a 3× 3 matrix game there are billions of strategically different games.
The lesson to be drawn from the overarching availability of special cases is that there
is an art as well as a science in selecting basic assumptions in the construction of
fruitful models in the sciences. In political economy the diffi culties in observation and
validation are such that on many (but not all) topics of critical concern in the design
of economic policy it is still possible to find professionals of repute with diametrically
opposed views of economic dynamics. This is noted not as a statement of despair
but caution when extending models of economic statics such as the competitive price
system from conversational dynamics as offered by Schumpeter and Keynes, to formal
mathematical models. The essay is the great instrument for hortation and the crusade
for new ideas and insights. It, in most instances, is preformal. It does not deal
with the many problems in data aggregation and disaggregation or the time lags
in implementation, all of which must be considered in bringing a perception to a
concretion. It is over a century since Schumpeter and Keynes started to elucidate
their insights and much is still in contention.
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium to Mutation and Schumpeter
Without having to add more complications than production and one Bernouilli ran-
dom variable it is possible to construct a strategic market game model with an inno-
vation well defined and directly comparable with the general equilibrium system.
A striking concept from the work of Schumpeter is the need for breaking the
circular flow of capital. The maintenance of the circular flow is central to balancing
the books in the static general equilibrium with only an accounting money.
The new essential ingredients that must be added to go from a general equilibrium
model to Schumpeterian innovation are:
1. A process model where the presence of any cost to trade implies the existence
of a money as an asset [6].
2. A potentially variable number of products in contrast with the fixed number of
products in the GE model.
3. At least one two state random variable to indicate a risk associated with an
attempt to produce a new commodity, where the cost of one’s investment is
lost if the innovation fails.
6 Such as the aggregate past, the present and an aggregated expected future.
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4. A specification as to how to evaluate a new good.
5. A definition of the market clearing mechanism.
6. A specification for the minimal existence of a debt or equity market or both.
7. A specification of default and bankruptcy rules if an innovator is unable to
repay a loan.
8. A specification of whether the process is finite or infinite
9. Initial and terminal conditions must be defined.
Even the simplest of models with only one opportunity for innovation turns out to
be somewhat complicated to formulate in a manner that it is amenable to a dynamic
programming analysis.
The specifics of a complete model amenable to analysis are presented in [19], [18],
Chapter 9.
Even with the highly simplified model that we analyzed some important features
emerge. In particular the Schumpeterian concept of breaking the circular flow of
capital is reflected in the mathematical feature that even with only one attempt at
innovation at least one resulting state of the economy must be in disequilibrium with
no general proof available that there exists a dynamic path that attains the equi-
librium state of the system 7. Many of the rational expectations dynamic program-
ming models applied to economics by Robert Lucas and his associates concentrate
on equilibrium states with little stress or attention to the adjustment possibilities of
disequilibrium.
3.2.1 Schumpeterian oligopolistic competition .
As was shown by Brian Arthur and colleagues in his broad study of increasing returns
[1] that in particular with stochastic processes once a competitor establishes a lead
the probability that the lead enlarges may increase. This rules out the possibility for
more than weak probabilistic prediction.
My interests have been in seeking the underlying basic abstractions required to
provide the many economic functions utilized in a financially controlled economy.
Some simple experimental models can be formulated to test their plausibility by play-
ing the games described as experimental games. Unfortunately this has not yet been
done for more than a few models. however the applications and empirical evidence
for the relevance of the Schumpeterian models requires considerable institutional de-
tail and the ability to manipulate to investigate far higher dimensional models than
those provided by Lucas [12] or by Ioannis, Karatzas, Shubik and William Sudderth
7Technically the check for the stability of the system involves solving the Lyapunov equations
and this is often not feasible.
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[9] and others. The examination of the Schumpeterian models has been pursued far
more in Europe than in the United States. The works of Richard Nelson and Sidney
Winter [14], Nelson [13] and Giovanni Dosi [4] and an active group at Pisa have both
run large simulations of Schumpeterian models where there is little if any hope for
attaining analytical results but they have attempted to match these simulations with
empirical data.
The important feature to stress is that the first description of Schumpeterian
system began with the assumption of the existence of a highly complex financial
control system over the productive resources of the economy. It had a high level of
competition present, but competition does not necessarily mean price competition.
The basic feature covering any profit oriented society is not whether the main strategic
variables are price, quantity, quality, manipulation of the legal system or methods of
financing, but it is in profit seeking by closing existing arbitrage opportunities by
whatever the strategic tools that are available happen to be. There is no guarantee
that the motions in closing these gaps necessarily lead to an equilibrium or even offer
us the ability to define more than local Optimality. This leads to considering the
political-economy relevance of government guidance.
The nature of the models modified from a general equilibrium background to
reflect process appears to conform to a biological interpretation. There is a clear
analogy between innovation and mutation in a birth death process. In our model the
individual faces the choice of continuing in a riskless state or buying a lottery ticket
where the payment represents the removal of resources currently used for production
or consumption to be employed in a risky venture that will either fail or will introduce
a new activity that can be added profitably to current activities. There is the danger
that the venture fails, if it does there is no innovation or mutation, if it succeeds there
is also the possibility that the innovation is born but is unable to recoup its financial
costs and cannot become profitable over the long run. In either instance the innovator
may go bankrupt. When a bankruptcy occurs the only items that are destroyed are
the IOU notes issued by defaulting borrowers. The physical resources including legal
money are redistributed. The same holds for the stillbirth of a failed mutation even
if only the vultures gain. There are good reasons to refer to bankruptcy financial
experts as ‘vulture capitalists’.
3.2.2 Unfinished business
In the work with Karatzas and Sudderth and in the book with Eric Smith it was
evident to us that the basic concepts underlying the Schumpeter assertions could
be modeled and mathematized using either discrete or continuous time methods;
but even for relatively innocuous problems such as a full life death process with
ongoing mutations the treatment of the complexity for a five or six agent model in
any generality calls for other methods such as simulation.
Although we have not yet been able to construct satisfactory fully rigorous models
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of them, there are at least two outstanding problems concerning the Schumpeterian
system worth noting, one is general and somewhat vague and the other more specific.
I sketch both of them together with my guesses and conjectures.
The first item involves the investigation of the ergodic properties of a constantly
mutating system. For simplicity limit consideration to only one perishable commod-
ity that can be either consumed or sold in a market. A simple form of innovation
might be that each firm is able to improve its production effi ciency by investing in
a risky procedure that consumes resources and either fails or succeeds in improving
production by making a more effi cient process available to the firm. Suppose that
there is a given constant population n of individuals, each of whom owns all the
(nontradable) shares of a firm with a single output and that each owner can tell
the firm how to use its resources on production, investment and dividends. Can we
describe the general conditions under which when we flesh in the details and select
reasonable representations of production, consumption and investment, the system is
non ergodic?
My guess is that the selection of plausible production, trading, uncertainty and
time lag conditions is so large that in general the system may be highly dependent
on initial conditions. Many agents, commodities, uncertainty and time lags can be
discussed easily in rhetoric and in essay form but a suffi ciently precise specification of
the state space of a broad class of financial control models is diffi cult to produce and
probably at best is useful in indicating limits on dynamic models. A more fruitful
approach is to have a specific question on a specific hand tailored empirical model
where the institutional constraints enable the investigator to bound the dynamics
and attempt empirical verification.
The second problem can be stated reasonably simply with some precision and the
phenomenon is easy to verify but has not yet been fully formalized. It is, "Can we
construct and solve a plausible economic model that attains an equilibrium state with
a constantly positive level of bankruptcy as part of this state without having to resort
to behavioral economic assumptions?" My conjecture is emphatically yes and that
the construction of such a model is consistent with the empirical observation of the
ever presence of bankrupt agents This suggests that even without having to resort
to the many different noneconomic behavioral explanations for active bankruptcy the
phenomenon can occur within a structure calling only for economic optimization.
I conjecture the possibility that some individuals may be more perceptive or pro-
fessional than others is suffi cient. Von Neumann andMorgenstern [22] even considered
the possibility of different refinements of perception many years ago.
An intuitive sketch of the process can be had from an ongoing Poker game. There
may be one or more regular patsies who always are net losers. They get cleaned out
during the game and are permitted to rejoin after they have paid their debts. They
accumulate enough money from an occupation outside of the game, pay their debts
and resume play. Given common knowledge of perceptions at different grid sizes
does not imply that the agents can learn to change these sizes or that they are
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irrational, mathematically the phenomenon is reflected in different constraints in the
optimization.
4 From General Equilibrium to Keynes and Be-
yond
In spite of the counterrevolutions against John Maynard Keynes his brilliance, ad-
vocacy and broad brush approach crystallized economic thought in its relationship
to the role of government in the guidance of the economy. Although he had both
the training and the abilities of a great theorist [10], [11] he excelled as a polemicist
for political economy. He understood the lack of coordination between the forces
of investment and consumption and advocated government action to help cure the
mismatch. Although a reasonably competent mathematician he was no great friend
of mathematical economics. It is almost ironical that Keynes having been liberated
from the chains of statics and equilibrium should have found that John Hicks in his
famous article Keynes and the Classics [8] should try to put the genie back into the
bottle by an ingenious construction for restoring equilibrium. As a great applied
economist and advocate in a world with few decent statistics he cut the Gordian
knot and invented items such the propensity to consume in order to be able moti-
vate a description of broad aggregate behavior of consumers to assemble the several
pieces need to provide for even the most elementary of dynamics. possibly one of
the great contributions of Keynes was the impetus given to many nations to start
to gather macroeconomic statistics which have served as the great empirical base for
the construction of the many and varied macoeconomic models that have been built.
The birth and growth of econometric methods since the 1930s provided the basis
for the large NBER and other multiple equation ad hoc models of the overall economy.
The macro models now range politically from the far left to the far right [17], p86
Table 3.3 and items such as Keynes’propensity to consume and various investment
models have been challenged and rejected or affi rmed by econometric studies. Utiliz-
ing extremely low dimensional models and rational expectations (that in game theory
terminology is a form of noncooperative equilibrium) Lucas [12] and his colleagues
have offered an enterprise viewpoint of dynamics far closer to competitive equilibrium
orthodoxy then to a Keynesian dynamics; but essentially all of the applied macro-
economic models of any size or political persuasion do not have a horizon of more
than five years. The difference are more in the equations of motion and the behav-
ioral dynamics than in structure. One of our major concerns has been in providing a
general methodology for model building ([18], Chapter 7) in doing so we have stressed
that the strategic market game provides the natural extension for the construction
of a process model for the general equilibrium model to encompass dynamics. We
observed that the general equilibrium model per se requires no equations of motion
both the work of Lucas [12] and his followers [?] and the work of Karatzas, Shubik
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and Sudderth [9] stay close to the competitive equilibrium paradigm, but Keynes and
many successors have encompassed many other behavioral assumptions that can be
justified by social-psychology, behavioral economics and the empirical evidence that
can be mustered to support them.
Keynes was highly instrumental in liberating economic dynamics; Pandora’s box
was opened and a swarm of dynamic models emerged that are being fought over today
as different intellectual boosts to policy.
5 The Future of Political-Economy
There is no royal road and no magic Philosophers’Stone that is going to provide for
an all encompassing economic dynamics at the same level that general equilibrium
answered the highly restricted but extremely pertinent questions it posed about the
conditions required for the existence of effi cient market clearing prices.
The dynamics of a mass economy with government and laws poses a host of
problems far more complex than the existence proof of an effi cient price system in a
pre-institutional economy.
The challenges and the dangers of bridging the gap between theory and practice
were eloquently noted in Edgeworth’s inaugural address in 1891 [7]. He commented
It is worth while to consider why the path of applied economics is so slippery;
and how it is possible to combine an enthusiastic admiration of theory with
the coldest hesitation in practice. The explanation may be partially given in
the words of a distinguished logician who has well and quaintly said, that if
a malign spirit sought to annihilate to whole fabric of useful knowledge with
the least effort and change, it would by no means be necessary that he should
abrogate the laws of nature. The links of the chain of causation need not be
corroded. Like effects shall still follow like causes; only like causes shall no
longer occur in collocation. Every case is to be singular; every species, like the
fabled Phoenix, to be unique. Now most of our practical problems have this
character of singularity; every burning question is a Phoenix in the sense of
being sui generis.
F.Y. Edgeworth, 1891
One might regard Edgeworth’s comments as an observation of extreme pessimism
however it contains a basic nub of truth when directed at application to economics.
When dealing with application there is no substitute for knowing your business. The
basic reason why applied economics is split into so many fields is that in application,
each of these specializations requires that relevant special details be added. The struc-
ture, mappings, functional forms and parameters are ad hoc and require knowledge
and expertise pertaining to the questions at hand.
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Virtually all applied economics deals with dynamics. In developing a special topic
such as banking or macro-economics or health economics a confusion between the roles
of theory and practise can easily arise.
5.1 What is a theory?
Different disciplines utilize the word theory differently. Furthermore model and theory
appear on occasion to be used interchangeably 8.
A conventional way to approach this question is to go to the dictionary for aid,
and it is useful to do so providing that one recognizes the weaknesses of dictionary
construction. Another way is to seek currently institutionalized scientific authorities.
The National Academy of Sciences of the United States suggests:
A plausible or scientifically acceptable, well-substantiated explanation
of some aspect of the natural world; an organized system of accepted
knowledge that applies in a variety of circumstances to explain a specific
set of phenomena and predict the characteristics of as yet unobserved
phenomena.
It also defines a fact as:
In science, a "fact" typically refers to an observation, measurement,
or other form of evidence that can be expected to occur the same way
under similar circumstances. However, scientists also use the term "fact"
to refer to a scientific explanation that has been tested and confirmed so
many times that there is no longer a compelling reason to keep testing it
or looking for additional examples (pace Black Swans).
Aristotel contrasted theory to "practise". Praxis, the Greek term for "doing",
is concerned with application; while pure theory is not concerned with immediate
application. An often used example comes from medicine. Medical research may
be concerned with attempting to understand the causes for a disease without be-
ing immediately concerned with practise. In contrast good practitioners are more
concerned with curing patients of a disease, and if they find a cure but not a deep
explanation they are reasonably content (as are the patients). Central bankers may
have the same view of the current financial system. Unfortunately, as yet, their level
of success appears to be far from that in medicine.
A mathematical view of a theory is deductive. A
theory’s (possibly full sensory or empirical ) content is given by basic axioms and a
formal logic develops the theory. The logical consequence of the axioms are presented
as theorems.
8Much of the material in this section is a paraphrasing of our joint work, hence I wish to ac-
knowledge again the lengthy and jointly productive discussions with Eric Smith.
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A semantic view of theories, is as models providing a logical framework connected
with some aspect of observation. They are abstractions or simplifications of some
aspects of the real world.
In economics there are many subdivisions that tend to intermix theory and prac-
tise. Possibly the major rift is between micro- and macro-economics
There are many subdivisions of microeconomics where practitioners and theorists
are highly intermixed.
A distinction often made to sort out the pure theorists as contrasted with those
with empirical concerns is between those devoted primarily to normative concerns
"what should be" as contrasted with those more inclined to positive economics stress-
ing "what is". Recently in finance and macro-economics the term "engineer" has been
used to indicate those involved with problems at hand. This may even include re-
treaded PhD physicists or top probability theorists devising complex derivatives or
algorithms to take advantage of local correlations in time series in stock trading.
Small purist areas are the bastion of some mathematical economists and philoso-
phers. Thus models abound varying the axioms on formal concepts of fair division,
bargaining and the mathematics of preference theory. The use of these models in
experimental economics and social psychology is increasing.
5.1.1 In praise of specialization
Beyond the major divisions of micro- and macro-economics not only are there many
economic theories with adjectives attached such as international economics, welfare
economics, labor economics, health economics and so forth; there are also divisions
such as behavioral economics where the assumptions on behavior, including individual
optimization and the standard models of utilitarian economic agents are challenged.
For example, some results in experimental gaming have indicated that the double
auction market is reasonably effi cient even when operated by agents with limited
intelligence.
The main thrust of macroeconomics is clearly operational. It deals with the dy-
namics of the whole economy encompassing features such as inflation, economic cycles
and growth, unemployment, and monetary and fiscal policy. An honorable employ-
ment for the macroeconomist is to give operational quantitative and qualitative advice
to governments.
The political economists, economic historians and historians of economic thought
still provide broad insights utilizing the essay form as their way to deal with the
imponderables.
Especially in application the closely related disciplines of finance, accounting, and
law intertwine with many economic investigations. The disciplines of sociology, social
psychology and psychology serve to challenge the axioms underlying many economic
models. And recently the disciplines of physics, ecology and biology have been con-
sidered as potential contributors to economic understanding of growth, innovation
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and evolution.
5.1.2 What is an application?
The applications of economic theory to society at the best are an intermix of sub-
stantive knowledge of a specific aspect of the economy together with at least one
reasonably well defined operationally relevant question such as how do we compare
the relative effectiveness of grade school education among the states of the United
States; or is world trade in foreign exchange derivatives of benefit to United States ’
trade? Such studies utilize ad hoc investigation bound together with economic prin-
ciples, methods from econometrics, operations research and the social and physical
sciences. Such work both nourishes theory and helps to support it.
5.2 Contact with sciences of both the material world and of
behavior
It is not the purpose of economics to describe all aspects of life. It should be the
purpose of economics to treat those domains it does describe with concepts and
models that can be made consistent with sound scientific understanding of the other
aspects of life, when they are needed to provide context.
At a minimum, economic behavior is embedded within the organic system of the
society; it affects extraction, production, utilization, exchange, consumption, and
disposal of physical entities and services which exist in the material world and in
time; it is supported by both informal and formal institutions, both of which rely on
cognitive propensities of people.
The economy may be viewed as a mechanism to organize a subset of the decisions
in a larger, highly distributed society. The social organization obeys no simple model
of control flow; its dynamics is often evolutionary at many scales of time, space, and
material content; and with these, it is subject to both historical contingency and
great complexity.
Within this dynamic context, the economy can be considered as an organ of
memory and of control 9.
Within the economy as well as in its embedding in context, actors with different
natural scales interact. Differences in scale exist between private citizens, firms,
central banks, and the government. In cases of incomplete contract (which should
be regarded as the norm rather than the exception) any of these may also interact
informally with social norms, cognitive constraints, or other frameworks that carry
power. Although such cases are diffi cult to model formally, it must be acknowledged
that they reflect much of reality. The models in the Shubik Smith book for the most
part contain only two levels, private citizens and a central government, but they are
9Particularly they enable coordination.
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intended to represent the more general case of interaction between agents of different
scale.
Leaving explicit roles for both government and cognition within the formal struc-
ture of economic theory can acknowledge a mismatch without necessarily having to
explain it, and can provide a starting point to study the limitations of markets as
well as their capabilities.
One of the defining features of governments is pre-commitment as an alternative
to contract, with mechanisms of policing based on power to enforce commitments.
In this respect governments are fundamentally different from either markets or the
other participants in market activity.
5.3 Finance, econophysics, biology, law and the renewal of
institutions
The three essays have focussed on the central role money and the development of
financial institutions as a control mechanism for the economy.
The body of the economy with its economic activities provides and utilizes the
products that support society. Money and financial institutions provide not only the
neural net of the body economic but connect and subserve it to the sociopolitical
direction of that society where the never ending philosophical problems of fairness,
equity, effi ciency, transferability, measurability and comparability (all of which are
still in the domain of the theorists and philosophers) are manifested in fresh party
platforms where their operationalized versions are presented by politicians and their
advisors, often with neither the knowledge nor the care that economic theorists were
aware of and had discussed the subtleties and pitfalls one or two hundred years ago.
The financial institutions also serve another basic purpose they provide the per-
ceptual devices in the markets to enable the evaluation of loans, insurance and a whole
array of other risks where progress is made towards better resolution, finer grids in
time and physical and probability measures. There is an intrinsic drive towards bet-
ter description and measurement. The Holy Grail of effi cient and complete markets
may always be there, but it is never attained. Instead in perpetual disequilibrium
the institutions change.
It has been said that "Science is measurement", this aphorism is attributed to
Henry Stacy Marks10, however this view has been rightly contested over time . I
suggest that science is a combination of ever improving description (as the work of
Santiago Ramon y Cajal illustrates) and increasingly accurate measurement, when
measurement can be defined usefully. The ‘hunting’overshoots in the financial mar-
kets and the disclosure and counter disclosure battles in the law courts are brothers
to races for scientific discovery.
The search for a final theory of money and financial institutions is clearly in the
10A relatively minor English painter (1829-1898)
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spirit of the scientific imperative of better and better approximations. We repre-
sent our work as a step in the escape from the earlier approximations based on the
great and previously useful simplifications of equilibrium and comparative equilib-
rium studies. The shift in paradigm to process models calls up a different and more
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